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Abstract
We consider the procurement of a complex, indivisible good when bid prepara-
tion is costly, assuming a population of heterogeneous contractors. Shortlist-
ing is introduced to implement the optimal number of bidders, and we explore
whether the procurer should reimburse the nonrecoverable cost of preparing
a bid in whole or in part. We find that a reimbursement policy is profitable for
the procurer only if performance and bidding costs are negatively correlated.
Moreover, negative rebates (entry fees) always dominate positive rebates.
Keywords: Procurement, Auctions, Entry.
JEL Classifications: D44; D45
1 introduction
In many procurements the drafting of a bid is costly. For example, in many
procurements funded by the World Bank, when contractors bid on the design
or construction of a power plant or a national health care system, a bid consists
of two envelopes, one containing the detailed technical proposal, and the other
containing the financial proposal. The cost of drafting the technical proposal
can easily amount to $100,000 and more. Yet, this cost cannot be recovered,
except by winning the contract. Naturally, in these circumstances contractors
are concerned not only about which proposals to make, but also whether to
submit a bid at all.
The typical institutional response to maintain incentives for participation is to
restrict the number of bidders. For example, the World Bank generally requires
contractors to first submit an expression of interest (EoI ), and then puts a cer-
tain number (typically up to six) of those who expressed interest on a “short
list.” Shortlisted contractors are invited to bid; no one else is allowed to bid.1
Another response is to reimburse the cost of bidding in whole or in part. For
example, the U.S. Department of Defense has used multiple sourcing policies
that subsidize the bid preparation for complex weapons systems (see McAfee
and McMillan, 1987). However, if one counts in the cost of reimbursements, it
is not obvious whether the procurer can actually benefit from such a policy.
The present paper examines this issue in the framework of a simple procure-
ment game that captures the stylized features of complex procurements. The
starting point is the “contractors’ game” by Lang and Rosenthal (1991). We ex-
tend this game to allow for heterogeneous contractors, introduce shortlisting to
implement the optimal number of bidders, and allow the procurer to reimburse
the cost of bidding in whole or in part.
Our main finding is that a reimbursement policy is profitable only if contrac-
tors are heterogeneous and reimbursements can change their sorting. If these
requirements are met, a profitable reimbursement policy exists only if perfor-
mance and bidding costs are negatively correlated. Moreover, an optimal reim-
bursement always prescribes a negative rebate (entry fee); positive rebates are
dominated in all circumstances.
There is a small literature on the role of reimbursement policies. Kaplan and
Sela (2006) explore reimbursements in the framework of a second–price auc-
tion. More in line with the present paper, Gal, Nemirovski, and Landsberger
(2003) assume a first–price auction; however, unlike in the present paper, they
do not allow the procurer to restrict the number of bidders, ignore negative
rebates, and assume a continuum of types. They claim that positive rebates are
always profitable, which cannot be confirmed in the present model.
2 base model
Our starting point is the “contractors’ game” by Lang and Rosenthal (1991).
There, n ≥ 2 identical contractors bid for one indivisible contract in a first–
price sealed–bid (reverse) auction. Contractors have two costs: the cost of
performing the contract (performance cost), c > 0, and a nonrecoverable cost
of preparing a bid, d > 0. The procurer’s reservation price of the good (and
1See The World Bank (2004a,b).
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highest accepted bid) is normalized to 1 and c + d < 1. Contractors have
complete information, yet the procurer does not know contractors’ costs.
The “contractors’ game” has a unique and symmetric equilibrium in mixed
strategies, (q, B). There, each contractor bids with probability q ∈ (0,1) ac-
cording to the continuous mixed bidding strategy B : [c + d,1]→ [0,1].
A key result is that the equilibrium price increases in n in the sense of first-
order stochastic dominance.2 Therefore, a profit maximizing procurer should
restrict the number of bidders to two.
If participation has been restricted to n = 2 the equilibrium strategies (q, B)
are:
q = 1− d
1− c (probability of bidding) (1)
B(b) = (1− c) (b − c − d)
(b − c) (1− c − d) (c.d.f. of bids). (2)
And the associated equilibrium expected profit of the procurer is equal to (ran-
dom equilibrium bids are denoted by b˜):3
π : = (1− (1− q)2)− (2q(1− q)E[b˜]+ q2E[min{b˜1, b˜2}]
)
= (1− (1− q)2)− 2q(1− q)
∫ 1
c+d
bdB(b)− q2
∫ 1
c+d
b2(1− B(b))dB(b)
= (1− c − d)
2
1− c .
(3)
(An alternative method to determine π that avoids tedious computations is to
compute the equilibrium expected surplus of the game, S:
S := (1− (1− q)2)(1− c)− q22d− 2q(1− q)d = (1− c − d)
2
1− c . (4)
Contractors’ equilibrium expected payoff is obviously equal to zero because
they must be indifferent between bidding and not bidding; hence, π = S.)
We augment this base model successively in two directions: 1) We allow the
procurer to reimburse d, in whole or in part, assuming bidding costs are ex
post verifiable; 2) We introduce a population of heterogeneous contractors and
incomplete information, and apply shortlisting to implement the optimaln = 2.
3 rebates do not pay if they cannot affect “sorting”
Here we maintain the assumption that contractors are identical, assume the
optimal n = 2, and explore whether it pays to (partially) reimburse the bidding
cost.
Suppose the procurer (partially) reimburses the bidding cost by paying a rebate
r = αd. This allows for full reimbursement (α = 1), no reimbursement (α = 0),
as well as entry fees (α < 0), and rewards for participation (α > 1).
2A similar adverse effect of increased competition was observed for Bertrand games in Elber-
feld and Wolfstetter (1999).
3The first term on the RHS of (3) is the procurer’s expected benefit; the second term his ex-
pected payment. The c.d.f. of min{b˜1, b˜2}, conditional on receiving two bids, is 1−
(
1− B(b))2.
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Introducing a rebate, reduces the bidding cost fromd to (1−α)d. This increases
q and stochastically lowers bids. Altogether, the equilibrium price decreases in
the sense of first–order stochastic dominance. Therefore, the procurer benefits,
however, at a cost that, as we will show, exceeds the benefit.
To compute the procurer’s equilibrium expected net profit:
Π := π − r
(
q22+ 2q(1− q)
)
, (5)
one must distinguish between α < 1 and α ≥ 1. For α < 1, Π can be computed
from (1), (2), (3), after replacing d by d′ := d− r , r = αd. Whereas, for α ≥ 1,
the game has a unique pure strategy equilibriumwhere both contractors submit
the bid b = c with probability 1 and π = 1 − c. Combining these results, one
finds, after a bit of rearranging,
Π =
⎧⎨
⎩
(1−c−d)2−α2d2
1−c , if α ≤ 1,
1− c − 2αd, if α ≥ 1. (6)
Evidently, Π has a global maximum at α = 0 (it has a stationary point at α = 0
and is pseudoconcave), and we conclude:
Proposition 1 In the basic contractors’ game with only one type of contractor
the best refunding policy is no refunding, r = 0.
4 extension: heterogenous contractors, rebates, and “sorting”
Now suppose there are two types of contractors that have different costs (c, d).
Types are named in such a way that the higher type index indicates the higher
total cost, t2 := c2+d2 > c1+d1 =: t1. The population of potential contractors is
sufficiently large to include at least two contractors of each type. The strategies
played if only type i submits an EoI are derived from (1) and (2) by setting
(c, d) = (ci, di) and are denoted by (qi, Bi), i ∈ {1,2}.4
In order to qualify for bidding, contractors must first submit an expression of
interest (EoI ). The procurer selects two contractors who have submitted an EoI,
if possible, on the short list. Only shortlisted contractors are allowed to bid.
Cost components are either positively or negatively correlated. Therefore, ei-
ther one of the cases summarized in Table 1 applies, where Δc := c2 − c1,
Δd := d2 − d1.
Δc > 0 Δc < 0
Δd > 0 case a (+) case b (–)
Δd < 0 case c (–) ∅
Table 1: Positive (+) and negative (–) correlation
As a first result we show that, under certain conditions, shortlisting induces
sorting of types that minimizes the total cost c + d:
4Heterogeneity is also assumed in Samuelson (1985), Levin and Smith (1994), McAfee and
McMillan (1987), and others. The main difference is that they assume a continuous distribution
of types, which implies that contractors’ costs differ with probability one.
3
Proposition 2 Suppose no reimbursement policy is employed. In equilibrium,
in cases a) and b) only (the low cost) type 1–contractors submit an EoI and play
the strategies (q1, B1). This applies also in case c) if and only if5
Δd > − d1
1− c1Δc. (7)
Proof: Suppose all type 1–contractors submit an EoI and, if shortlisted, play
the strategy (q1, B1) while all but one type 2–contractors do not submit an EoI.
The deviating type 2–contractor submits an EoI, and, if shortlisted, makes a bid
b ∈ (c2 + d2,1]. We show that if that deviator happens to be on the short list,
his expected payoff, U ′2, is negative. By definition of U
′
2 and the equilibrium
strategy (q1, B1) one obtains
U ′2 = −d2 + q1 (1− B1(b)) (b − c2)+ (1− q1) (b − c2) (8)
0 = −d1 + q1 (1− B1(b)) (b − c1)+ (1− q1) (b − c1) . (9)
Deduct (9) from (8) and one has
U ′2 = (c1 + d1)− (c2 + d2)+Δcq1B1(b) (10)
= − (1− q1B1(b))Δc −Δd. (11)
Combining case a) with (11) resp. case b) with (10) implies U ′2 < 0. Finally,
combining case c) with condition (7) one finds
0 > − d1
1− c1Δc −Δd
= −(1− q1)Δc −Δd (by definition of q1)
≥ −(1− q1B1(b))Δc −Δd (for all b ∈ (c1 + d1,1])
which implies U ′2 < 0. 
However, this sorting does not always maximize the procurer’s expected profit.
A glance at (3) indicates that the procurer may wish to replace type 1– by type
2–contractors if the performance cost c2 is higher than c1 and the resulting
increase in total cost is not too high. This suggests that rebates may serve a
useful role to induce the right sorting of types.
A reimbursement policy cannot affect the sorting of types if rebates are paid
uniformly. Therefore, rebates must be type dependent, r1 ≠ r2.
A desired change in sorting can be induced equally by a positive rebate (“carrot”)
and by a negative rebate or entry fee (“stick”):
Lemma 1 One can always find a negative rebate (entry fee) (r1 < 0, r2 = 0) that
crowds out type 1 and crowds in type 2. The smallest positive subsidy that also
achieves this is (r1 = 0, r2 = Δc + Δd + , with  = 0 in cases a) and c) and
 ≥ −Δc(1−c1−d1)1−c1 in case b).
Proof: Obviously, r1 = −(1−c1−d1) (entry fee) achieves the assumed sorting.
Consider a positive rebate (r1 = 0, r2 > 0). The assumed sorting is induced if
only type 2–contractors participate and no type 1–contractor has an incentive
5If (7) does not hold, perfect sorting is not an equilibrium.
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to deviate and submit an EoI, and type 2 plays the strategies (q2, B2) which
are derived from (1), (2) by setting (c, d) = (c2, d2 − r2). For convenience we
continuously extend the domain of B2 to [0,1] by setting B2(b) = 0 for all
b < c2 + d2 − r2.
By an argument similar to the proof of Proposition 2 this is assured if and only if
for all b ∈ (c1+d1,1] the payoff of the deviating type 1–contractor is negative.
Setting r2 = Δc +Δd+ , one obtains
U ′1 = Δd− r2 + q2(1− B2(b))Δc + (1− q2)Δc
= −q2B2(b)Δc −  < 0. (12)
In cases a) and c) this inequality is obviously satisfied for  = 0, but not for
 < 0, in which case c2 + d2 − r2 > c1 + d1 and hence B(b) = 0 for b ∈
(c1 + d1, c2 + d2 − r2]. Therefore, in these cases the stipulated positive rebate
is the smallest one that induces the desired sorting.
In case b) the inequality (12) can only be satisfied for
 ≥ −Δc(1− c1 − d1)
1− c1 . (13)
Therefore, the stipulated r2 = Δc + Δd+  is also the smallest positive rebate
that achieves the assumed sorting in this case. 
However, negative rebates (entry fees) always dominate positive rebates:
Proposition 3 (Carrot vs. Stick) Consider reimbursement policies that crowd
out type 1 and crowd in type 2 either by subsidizing d2 (positive rebate) or by
taxing d1 (entry fee). The policy that employs a negative rebate (entry fee) is in
all cases more profitable for the procurer than that which uses a positive rebate.
Proof: Consider the negative rebate (tax) and alternatively the smallest posi-
tive rebate (subsidy) that induce the assumed sorting, stated in Lemma 1. The
procurer’s expected net profits under the tax, Πt , resp. the subsidy, Πs , are
Πt = (1− c2 − d2)
2
(1− c2) (14)
Πs = (1− c2 − d2 + r2)
2
1− c2 −
(
q222r2 + 2q2(1− q2)r2
)
. (15)
Assume cases a) and c). Insert the subsidy rate r2 = Δc +Δd into (15) and one
finds Πt −Πs = (Δc +Δd)2/(1− c2) > 0.
Assume case b). Insert the subsidy rate r2 = Δc+Δd− Δc(1−c1−d1)1−c1 into (15) and
one finds Πt −Πs = (c1d2−c2d1−Δd)
2
(1−c1)2(1−c2) > 0. 
Proposition 4 In cases a) and b) one cannot find a reimbursement policy that
increases the procurer’s expected profit.
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Proof: We show that in both cases there is no profitable reimbursement policy
that “taxes” d1, i.e., with r1 < 0, r2 = 0. By Proposition 3 taxes dominate
subsidies. Therefore, there is no profitable subsidy policy either.
1) Without reimbursement, by Proposition 2 only type 1–contractors participate
and play the strategy (q1, B1). Therefore, the procurer’s equilibrium expected
profit without reimbursement is Π1 = (1 − c1 − d1)2/(1 − c1) = π1. A reim-
bursement policy can only change the procurer’s expected profit if it induces
a different sorting, i.e., if it crowds out type 1 and crowds in type 2 and gives
rise to the expected gross profit π2 := (1− c2 −d2)2/(1− c2). However, this is
not profitable, since
ΔΠ := Π2 −Π1 ≤ π2 −π1 ≡ π1
(
Δc
1− c1 −
2(Δc +Δd)
1− c1 − d1
)
(16)
is negative in cases a) and b). In equilibrium, the “tax” is not collected. There-
fore, the procurer earns no additional income due to the negative rebate. 
Proposition 5 In case c) the procurer can raise his expected profit by “taxing”
the bidding cost d1 (entry fee) if and only if Δd is bounded by
−Δc d1
1− c1 < Δd < −Δc
1− c1 + d1
2(1− c1) . (17)
Proof: By Lemma 1we know that there is a negative rebate (“tax”) that induces
the required sorting. It gives rise to the expected profitΠ2 = π2. By Proposition
2, in the absence of rebates only type 1 participates if and only if Δd > −Δc d11−c1
in which case the procurer’s expected profit is equal to Π1 = π1.
By (16) it follows that π2 > π1 if in addition Δd < −Δc 1−c1+d12(1−c1) holds.
This parameter set is not empty since Δc > 0 and
1− c1 + d1
2(1− c1) <
1− c1 + d1
1− c1 <
d1
1− c1 .
Finally, one must make sure that Δc is such that the total cost is increasing,
i.e., Δd > −Δc. However, this is automatically assured by Δd > −Δc d11−c1 . 
5 discussion
In the present paper we generalized the well–known contractors’ game to in-
clude heterogeneous contractors. We used that model to explore whether the
procurer should reimburse contractors’ bidding costs in whole or in part.
Altogether, we found that a reimbursement policy is profitable only if it can
induce a more desirable sorting of types. Interestingly, this can occur only
if it crowds out contractors with the lower performance cost, which requires
that performance and bidding costs are negatively correlated. Moreover, the
“stick approach” to sorting that employs negative rebates as a deterrent always
dominates the “carrot approach” that employs positive rebates.
The three critical assumptions of our analysis are: a “large” population of po-
tential contractors that contains at least two bidders of the same type, ex post
6
verifiability of the cost of bidding, and the restriction to populations with only
two types.6 In future extensions one may wish to relax these assumptions.
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